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Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Modern War Studies) | 
 enlarge | Author: Robert M. Citino
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Category: Book
List Price: $34.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  11 reviews
Sales Rank: 20018
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 431
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.9
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.2 x 1.5
ISBN: 0700615318
Dewey Decimal Number: 940.541343
EAN: 9780700615315
ASIN: 0700615318
Publication Date: October 7, 2007
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Book Description
For Hitler and the German military, 1942 was a key turning point of World War II, as an overstretched but still lethal Wehrmacht replaced brilliant victories and huge territorial gains with stalemates and strategic retreats. In this major reevaluation of that crucial year, Robert Citino shows that the German army's emerging woes were rooted as much in its addiction to the "war of movement"--attempts to smash the enemy in "short and lively" campaigns--as they were in Hitler's deeply flawed management of the war. From the overwhelming operational victories at Kerch and Kharkov in May to the catastrophic defeats at El Alamein and Stalingrad, Death of the Wehrmacht offers an eye-opening new view of that decisive year. Building upon his widely respected critique in The German Way of War, Citino shows how the campaigns of 1942 fit within the centuries-old patterns of Prussian/German warmaking and ultimately doomed Hitler's expansionist ambitions. He examines every major campaign and battle in the Russian and North African theaters throughout the year to assess how a military geared to quick and decisive victories coped when the tide turned against it. Citino also reconstructs the German generals' view of the war and illuminates the multiple contingencies that might have produced more favorable results. In addition, he cites the fatal extreme aggressiveness of German commanders like Erwin Rommel and assesses how the German system of command and its commitment to the "independence of subordinate commanders" suffered under the thumb of Hitler and chief of staff General Franz Halder. More than the turning point of a war, 1942 marked the death of a very old and traditional pattern of warmaking, with the classic "German way of war" unable to meet the challenges of the twentieth century. Blending masterly research with a gripping narrative, Citino's remarkable work provides a fresh and revealing look at how one of history's most powerful armies began to founder in its quest for world domination. This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 6 more reviews...
 Death of the Whermacht June 17, 2008
This is a great book, it has tons of interesting facts. Its also very well written.
 Biggest Problem is the Constant Re-Statement of the Same Premise May 18, 2008
3 out of 4 found this review helpful
Citino has written a very readable book, but he has the habit of constantly restating his premise about why the Wehrmacht failed. How many times do you need to be reminded that the style of encirclement became outmoded once the Soviets decided to retreat instead of standing and fighting?
In truth three (3) things caused the failure of the Wehrmacht in Russia.
1) The lack of German sensitivity to the needs to create logistical systems when fighting a war hundreds of miles within another country. So many times during battles or ongoing operations, the Panzer armies had to stop because they ran out of fuel. A mobile army survives on movement, without fuel there is no movement and tanks become sitting ducks. Just as tanks need fuel, soldiers need supplies like food and water (especially in the dessert). Because there were limited road systems in most of the Eastern Ukraine, weather would reek havoc with the ability of the quartermaster corp to keep up with the Armies needs. In the end it caused the loss of the 6th Army at Stalingrad.
2) Replacements. By the middle of 1942 the Germans were busy with their final conscription of 18 and 19 year olds. They had now run out of men to fight, and had already lost a large proportion of the experienced men who had fought in 1940 and 1941. Having started Operation Barbarosa with over 1/2 million horses to move supplies and pull artillery, by '42 they had lost half of these and many were worn out and useless. They had also reached the point where they were losing more tanks and planes then they were able to replace. At the same time they were depending more and more on their Allies to take up bigger parts of the fighting. These Allies had even more problems with logistics and replacements then the German Army.
3) No coherent plan as to how to hold the territory they had conquered. During many of the battles, large groups of Soviet Soldiers had been passed by and left for the 'Rear Guard' to deal with. The Soviets were able to arms these 'Partisan' units which spent much of their time destroying the infrastructure needed to bring up supplies to the Fronts. An inordinate amount of the men, machines, supplies (especially fuel) was being used to carry out the destruction of the Jewish population as well as dismantling the Soviet Aparatch (the Communist Party structure). The men and time wasted could have been put to better use, as well as the able bodied men they killed off.
Citino spends some time discussing these issues, but mostly concentrates on the out-and-outright losses from battle. He never discusses the issues of the average soldier, but spends most of his time either praise or crucifying some General or Field Marshall. In his discussion of the Battle of Stalingrad he gives little thought to the idea that by bombing the city into rubble before they attacked it, the Germans made their job twice as difficult by making the city impassible.
On last issue is that the maps in the book are in most cases so weak as to be useless. None of them have scales, so you can't judge size or distances; and many of the landmarks he mentions in the text aren't marked on the maps. Also there is no key as to what the symbols stand for (yes their standardized) but not everyone knows a tank corp from a cavalry division. It almost as if he is making an aside that 'real' military history buffs will understand and to bad for the rest of us. This attitude (which is like a verbal smirk) shows up in many places in the book and I found it distracting.
 Very good reading with couple of mishaps May 14, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
A very good reading indeed. Citino's idea to trace the origins of German art of war back through the centuries is very original and finally brings it all into place. After finishing this book, I immediately bought his German Way of War and enjoy it even more.
Why only 4 stars? Well, I took one full star off for ignoring the other battles of 1942 on the Eastern front. Yes, there was much more than just Blau going on there: at least 2 major attempts to relieve Leningrad, and several Soviet offensives against Army Group Center (at Sukhinichi, at Kozelsk, "The Summer Rzhev," "The Winter Rzhev,") along with some German counter-action, like Operation Wilberwind. Of course, these battles were closer in their nature to trench warfare of WWI and could not be of much interest to the author, who is focused on battles of manoeuvre in the South of USSR and Africa. However, although Red Army achieved little and these battles cost Russians dearly, these "forgotten battles" also bled white Army Group Center and severely depleted German reserves. Two of the Panzer divisions originally intended for Blau, the 9th and the 11th, were left in the 2nd Army sector. Most of the remaining Army Group's Panzer divisions were mauled so badly that none would be available for the effort to relieve Stalingrad kessel, except for the 17th Panzer, at battalion strength. None would be available later, after Stalingrad, when the Red Army conducted two successful operations, crushing the open Southern flank of the German line at Rossosh' and Voronezh. Only by the "3d Battle of Kharkov" did the Germans recover and restore the balance. So part of the reason why did Blau fail with such a loud bang was that nothing was quiet on the Eastern front.
I took off another half star for not checking details. The story of how two Soviet mechanized corps, the 8th and the 13th, collided at the very start of the war, "creating a traffic jam of epic proportions," and how the Germans smashed them both while they were still sorting themselves out, comes from Pleshakov's "Stalin's Folly," and Citino copy-pasted this paragraph into the book from his own review of SF in the April 2006 issue of World War II. Well, the glory of the moment fades once you learn that the corps with the number 13 was not a Mechanized, but a Rifle corps (the 13th Mechanized was assigned to the 10th Army in the Western front sector); that there was no traffic jam at all (general Ryabyshev, the commander of the 8th Mechanized, noted in his memoirs that the marching troops of the 13th Rifle corps slowed him down and "his vehicles could not go at full speed"); and, most important, that the Germans did not smash the two corps at the moment. The 8th Mechanized later counter-attacked against the 57th Infantry and 16th Panzer divisions on June 26th and 27th near Dubno. It was practically destroyed and later reorganized into a tank division. The 13th Rifle corps kept marching on and was trapped much later in the Uman pocket. Such a blunder is inexcusable for a historian of Robert Citino's talent.
Anyway, since there is no 3.5 star rating here, I round it up to 4 stars, with hopes that these minor flaws would be corrected in the 2nd edition of this book.
Fresh and interesting May 5, 2008
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
Cetino is a master at his craft. His knowledge is deep and his research is thorough. I really enjoyed his book. He is not in the usual vein of triumphalist American authors. He places blame and credit where it is due and he is even handed in his assessment of all participants.
His selection of campaigns is the key to his success and his discourse on why the Germans fought the way they did and why the Russians and the British fought the way they did is both incisive and highly readable.
His coverage of the German campaign in the Crimea and the Caucasus is a very interesting coverage of a little known but very important and major campaign.
His analysis of Alamein, while shorter, is also quite brilliant in its lucidity. he is the first author I know who has identified, quite so clearly, that Montgomery's WW1 experience taught him what worked for the British and what did not. He explains why Montgomery fought the Afrika Corps the way he did. The British way - slow and deliberate and with the application of massive force - especially artillery. Montgomery was indeed pedestrian but within these constraints he knew what he was doing and he did it passably well. Cetino explains how and why.
Cetino spells out the relevant circumstances with clarity and makes fairly the telling point that the Russians paid for their eventual success with massive casualties. In the African campaign it was logistics, much of it from the US, that helped the British win at Alamein.
The book is a very good read and a very balanced one also.
title misleading, but book well-written April 2, 2008
1 out of 2 found this review helpful
The title "Death of the Wehrmacht" is misleading: it suggests that 1942 was the point of no return, but the Wehrmacht had one last shot: the Battle of Kursk, summer 1943;
the importance of the much-neglected Battle of Kursk is stressed in e.g. The Battle of Kursk.
The book itself is concise and well-written. A plus is that the author relates the Wehrmacht's conduct of war to the old Prussian-German tradition.
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